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MOTOR VEIDCLE AIR POLLUTION: 
STATE AUTHORITY AND 
FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION 
David P. Currie* 
T HE problem of state authority over motor vehicle air pollution was recently highlighted when the Illinois Air Pollution Control 
Board, for the first time, adopted regulations to deal with vehicle 
emissions.1 Those regulations are disappointingly feeble. Except for 
outlawing visible smoke and for making it unlawful to dismantle 
pollution control devices, the new rules do nothing but state that 
the Board may decide to do something in the future about pollution 
from automobiles. 
In attempting to improve upon these regulations, however, one 
is struck with a sense of considerable futility. Given the present 
limits of technology and the necessarily legislative nature of some of 
the most promising approaches, there is little that an administrative 
agency could do under even the best conditions. But unfortunately, 
even this little is partially denied to the agencies by a misguided 
federal pre-emption provision. That provision appears in the Air 
Quality Act of 19672 and severely restricts the power of the states to 
deal with this urgent problem. It is the purpose of this Article both 
to stimulate the abolition of the pre-emption provision3 and to ex-
plore the areas that are presently open for state regulation. 
l. THE NEED FOR STATE CONTROL OF AUTOMOBILE 
EXHAUST EMISSIONS 
The automobile, as we know it, not only causes great problems 
of traffic, accidents, parking, and junkyards; it also spews vast 
amounts of assorted poisons into the air. It is grossly misleading to 
say, as industrial polluters are wont to do, that vehicles are responsible 
for sixty per cent of our air pollution.4 Such tonnage comparisons 
• Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Member of the Illinois Air Pollution Con-
trol Board. A.B. 1957, University of Chicago; LL.B. 1960, Harvard University.-Ed. 
While I make no attempt to disclaim the biases of a state administrator hamstrung 
by federal law, I do not pretend to speak for the Board in this Article. 
1. ILLINOIS Am POLLtrrION CONTROL BOARD, RULES &: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE 
CONTROL OF Am POLLtrrION ch. VI (March 25, 1970). 
2, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). See text accompanying note 32 infra. 
3. A bill to repeal the pre-emption section has been introduced in the House by 
Congressman Mikva of Illinois. H.R. 16,013, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
4. See, e.g., the advertisement published by the Commonwealth Edison Co. in the 
Chicago Daily News, Dec. 17, 1969, at 35. 
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ignore the fact that some pollutants are worse than others; sulfur 
dioxide, for example, when coupled with particulate matter, is more 
than one hundred times as toxic as carbon monoxide.5 Nonetheless, 
the danger from automobile emissions is a significant one. Auto-
mobiles have single-handedly ruined the atmosphere of Los An-
geles;6 and the United States Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) has indicated that almost every city with a popu-
lation greater than 50,000 persons has a vehicle pollution problem.7 
Because of incomplete combustion and evaporation, the internal-
combustion engine produces carbon monoxide and unburned hy-
drocarbons. Because of high temperatures, it oxidizes nitrogen in 
the air. In addition, the automobile discharges lead and other fuel 
additives. In the presence of sunlight these several pollutants react in 
complex ways to produce additional poisons that irritate the eyes, 
destroy rubber, and can, in sufficient quantities, be very harmful for 
lungs. Moreover, carbon monoxide can be very dangerous by itself: 
It has long been a popular suicide tool; the Nazis used it to murder 
political prisoners; and eight-hour exposure to concentrations not 
uncommon along metropolitan expressways can destroy the useful-
ness of up to five per cent of the blood in a human body, with ad-
verse effects on health and judgment.8 At least one organic com-
ponent of automotive smog is strongly suspected to be a cause of 
cancer.9 
It might be argued, however, that everything is under control 
since the federal government has prescribed emission standards for 
automobiles.10 This is an erroneous contention. The federal stan-
dards apply only to vehicles manufactured during or after the 1968 
model year.11 Furthermore, the devices installed to meet those stan-
5. New York has prescribed, largely on the basis of health considerations, one-
hour maximum ambient air concentrations (to be less than a given value 99% of the 
time on an annual basis) of 60 ppm CO and 0.25 to 0.40 ppm SO2• N.Y. Pun. HEALTH 
LAw §§ 1271, 1276 (McKinney Supp. 1969); 10 NYCRR § 501, app. 6. 
6. See D. CARR, THE BREATH OF LIFE chs. 5, IO (1965). 
7. Hearings on H.R. 463 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 144 (1965). 
8. See Hurn, Mobile Combustion Sources, in 3 AIR POLLUTION 55 (2d ed. A. Stern 
1968); Stokinger &: Coffin, Biologic Defects of Air Pollutants, in 1 id. 445; Tebbens, 
Gaseous Pollutants in the Air, in I id. 23, 30-33; Agnew, Automotive Air Pollution 
Research, in 307 PROC. OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY 153-81 (1968); STAFF OF SENATE COM· 
MERGE COMM., 9lsr CONG., lsr SESS., REPORT ON THE SEARCH FOR A Low-EMISSION VE• 
HIGLE 2-3 (Comm. Print 1969); D. CARR, supra note 6, passim. 
9. HEW, REsUME OF AIR QUALITY CRITERIA FOR CARBON MONOXIDE (March 1970). 
IO. Federal standards were first authorized by the Act of Oct. 20, 1965, Pub. L. No. 
89-272, tit. I, § 101(8), 79 Stat. 992, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
11. 31 Fed. Reg. 5170 (1966); 33 Fed. Reg. 8304 (1968). The 1968 regulations, ap• 
plicable to 1970 vehicles, ,are presently found in 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.1-.133 (1969). 
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dards reduce emissions of hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide some-
what, but by no means completely; in a few years the increase in the 
vehicle population may offset the gains. Moreover, reductions of 
hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emissions are achieved by more 
complete combustion, which tends actually to increase nitrogen-
oxide emissions. Another inadequacy of the federal law is that there 
is no federal requirement that the devices be maintained or inspected, 
even though tests have shown an alarming deterioration in the 
effectiveness of such devices after they have been on a car while it 
has traveled a few thousand miles.12 Finally, there are no standards at 
all for lead emissions or even for visible smoke from gasoline-powered 
engines, and nitrogen oxides are not covered even by the standards 
for 1970 models. 
But, one might say, if the federal program is inadequate, surely 
the states are to blame for not solving the problem themselves. This, 
too, is erroneous. It is true that, with the exception of California, 
the states had done very little about vehicle pollution before the 
federal government acted in 1965. But that does not justify the 
decision of Congress, in its wisdom-or more accurately, responsive 
to the wisdom of the automobile manufacturers-to make it very 
difficult for the states to do anything about motor vehicle pollution 
ever again. Just because the auto makers preferred not to have to 
meet more than one standard, a section of the federal statute now 
forbids the states, except California, to regulate emissions from new 
vehicles.13 
It might be argued that even if pre-emption is removed, the 
states would be precluded by a lack of the necessary technological 
expertise from doing anything beyond what the federal government 
has done to regulate motor vehicle air pollution. But even if pres-
ent technology permitted no more than the existing federal stan-
dards require, there is value in allowing the states to capitalize on 
new technology as it emerges, rather than making them wait for the 
12. See REPORT ON THE SEARCH FOR A Low-EMISSION VEHICLE, supra note 8, at 4-8. 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). The most significant portions of the 
statute are set out in the text accompanying note 32 infra. The section providing the 
exception for California reads as follows: 
(b) The Secretary shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, waive 
application of this section to any State which has adopted standards (other than 
crankcase emission standards) for the control of emissions from new motor vehicles 
or new motor vehicle engines prior to March 30, 1966, unless he finds that such 
State does not require standards more stringent than applicable Federal standards 
to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions or that such State standards and 
accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent with section 202(a) of 
this title. 
4!? U.S.C. § 1857f-6a(b) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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ponderous federal administrative machinery to amend the standards 
for the whole nation. In addition, there are measures that the murky 
technology now permits and that the federal regulations do not re-
qtiire. For example, one oil company markets a leadless gasoline in 
the East and Southeast;14 thus, limits on lead emissions are con-
ceivable. Moreover, there is evidence that if the lead were removed 
from all fuel, it might be possible to require catalytic mufflers which 
would greatly reduce emissions of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, 
and even nitrogen oxides.15 Another example of potential state 
legislation is a recent California bill-eventually defeated after it 
had passed one house of the state legislature-that would have 
banned the sale of internal-combustion engines after 1975.16 One 
strongly suspects that if such a law were passed, the auto industry 
would suddenly discover that the obstacles to alternative power sys-
tems, such as steam and electricity, are not so insuperable after all.17 
At the very least the states might regulate visible smoke emissions. 
Although such emissions are far from the most important vehicle 
emission problem today, vehicle smoke can be annoying and is not 
insignificant as a contributor to over-all particulate concentrations.18 
There are other possible types of state legislation, not all of 
which are forbidden by federal law. But there is still no excuse for 
pre-emption. It is inherently improbable that the federal govern-
ment will prescribe for the whole country standards that are strong 
enough to protect the air in our most populated cities. In fact, it is 
not clear that such standards would be desirable in places such as 
14. See N.Y. Times, March 30, 1970, at 27. 
15. See Testimony of John 0. Logan, President, Universal Oil Products Co., Before 
the California Assembly Comm. on Transportation, Dec. 4, 1969; AIR&: WATER NEWS, 
Jan. 5, 1970, at 4; Hurn, supra note 8, at 70-71, 75; R.S. Berry, The Current Status 
of Automotive Pollution Abatement 5-6 (unpublished, Jan. 1970). The catalyst manu-
factured by Universal Oil Products has been partially successful even in the presence 
of lead, and Professor Berry therefore suggests that it might be required in all auto-
mobiles even if lead is not removed from gasolines. 
16. See AIR&: WATER NEWS, Aug. 4, 1969, at I. 
17. The rosy picture of steam cars that was painted by the Commerce Committee 
staff [see REPORT ON THE SEARCH FOR A Low-EMISSION VEHICLE, supra note 8], has been 
marred by the announcement by William Lear, one of the leading members of the 
Committee Staff, that steam does not seem to be a practicable alternative to gasoline. 
See .AIR &: WATER NEWS, Jan. 12, 1970, at 5. At an earlier date, Lear had branded a 
report that he was giving up on steam as "a misstatement put out by someone in 
Detroit." See Chicago Daily News, Nov. 20, 1969, at 65, col. 4. Lear has now indicated 
that he is hoping that the gas turbine will prove satisfactory. AIR&: WATER NEWS, Jan. 
12, 1970, at 5. 
18. Studies by the National Air Pollution Control Administration on emissions have 
estimated that in 1966, vehicles were responsible for 15% of all particulate emissions 
in the New York metropolitan area. See HEW, NEW YORK-NEW JERSEY AIR POLLUTION 
.ABATEMENT .ACTIVITY, PHASE II, PRE-CoNFERENCE lNvESTIGATIONS 45 (1967}, 
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rural Kansas, where air pollution may not be a significant problem. 
But the federal authorities have not yet tried to prescribe different 
standards for different regions, and it is questionable whether they 
have authority to do so.19 Moreover. federal pre-emption stifles 
creativity by eliminating, except in California, the "laboratory" 
functions of state and local governments that Justices Holmes and 
Brandeis were so taken with.20 State experimentation led to the fed-
eral standards in the first place; thus, Congress has seriously wounded 
the goose that lays golden eggs. Furthermore, there is always some-
thing undesirable about legislation that forbids the states from 
protecting the health and comfort of their people. Minimum federal 
standards are admirable, and perhaps indispensable, since the states 
were not doing the job. But to forbid stricter state standards is 
inexcusable. Finally, pre-emption is wholly inconsistent with Con-
gress' explicit expectation that the states will prescribe and imple-
ment air quality standards for automotive pollutants.21 Congress, 
then, has asked the states to control pollution and simultaneously 
has deprived them of effective authority to do so. 
II. THE RATIONALE OF PRE-EMPTION 
The history of federal concern with automobile air pollution is 
found in the legislative history both of the National Emission Stan-
dards Act, enacted in 1965, and of the 1967 amendments to that Act, 
which were contained in the Air Quality Act. Although the pre-
emption provision was not enacted until 1967, the 1965 history is 
pertinent, since several individuals indicated concern at that time 
with the pre-emption problem. 
A. The 1965 Act 
Until 1965, federal statutes for the control of air pollution were 
silent as to motor vehicle emissions, and there was a general statu-
tory declaration that "the prevention and control of air pollution at 
19. See Hearings on Automotive Air Pollution Before the Subcomm. on Air and 
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1967) 
(testimony of Dean Coston, HEW) [hereinafter Senate Automotive Hearings]. 
20. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Justice Brandeis, dissenting). 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(c) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). This subsection authorizes the states 
to adopt ambient air quality standards applicable to regions designated pursuant to 
§ 1857c-2 as "air quality control regions," and it provides certain procedures which the 
state must follow in doing so. The subsection generally provides for cooperation be-
tween state and federal officials in setting the proper standards for the various regions. 
This is consistent with the declaration of § 1857d(b), that "municipal, state, and 
interstate action to abate air pollution shall be encouraged • • • ." 
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its source is the primary responsibility of State and local govem-
ments."22 Relying in part upon a prior version of that provision, the 
United States Supreme Court in 196023 upheld a local ordinance im-
posing smoke limitations on vessels engaged in interstate commerce: 
"State regulation, based on the police power, which does not dis-
criminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its re-
quired uniformity, may constitutionally stand."24 If it were not for 
the statutory pre-emption provision enacted in 1967, this decision 
would provide strong authority for upholding state regulation of 
vehicle emissions.25 
In 1965 the Secretary of HEW was first authorized to prescribe 
"standards, applicable to the emission of any kind of substance, from 
any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle 
engines .... "26 Although the authorizing legislation contained no 
specific mention of the power of the states to regulate the same 
subject, one reason for federal standards was the desirability of uni-
formity. The Senate Committee on Public Works stated that "it 
would be more desirable to have national standards rather than for 
each State to have a variation in standards and requirements which 
could result in chaos insofar as manufacturers, dealers, and users are 
concemed."27 The committee also expressed the hope "that indi-
vidual States will accept national standards rather than additionally 
impose restrictions which might cause undue and unnecessary ex-
pense to the user."28 Senator Edmund S. Muskie, responding to a 
suggestion that the states should be free to set standards stricter than 
the federal standards, said that such a situation would be "almost 
impossible" because of the interstate mobility of vehicles. He added: 
"Do you think a given manufacturer could produce automobiles 
meeting fifty standards?"29 However, Harry F. Barr, of the Auto-
22. Clean Air Act § 10l(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1964). 
23. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
24. 362 U.S. at 448. 
25. A recent California decision, however, limited state power to regulate smoke 
from railroad diesel engines. California v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 74 Cal. Rptr. 222, 
268 Cal. App. 2d 501 (Cal. App. 1968). But that case is distinguishable from the 
case discussed in the text, for the California decision was based on a finding that 
compliance with the regulation would be impracticable even in the intrastate context. 
For cases concerning state power to regulate nonpollution aspects of interstate motor 
traffic, see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Maurer v. Hamilton, 
309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 
177 (1938). 
26. National Emission Standards Act § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-l (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
27. S. REP. No. 192, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1965). 
28. Id. at 8. 
29. Hearings on S. 306 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 
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mobile Manufacturers' Association (AMA), observed that the statute 
did not ensure that the states would refrain from imposing addi-
tional standards.30 Thus, although the 1965 statute was silent on the 
subject of federal pre-emption, one could plausibly have argued at 
that time that state regulation was to some extent limited by the 
authorization for federal standards.31 
B. The 1967 Act 
Despite the 1965 federal standards, several states proceeded to 
consider or to enact legislation concerning vehicle emissions. In 
response to those state activities, Congress clarified the federal policy 
and explicitly limited state power by adopting, in the 1967 Air 
Quality Act, a stringent pre-emption provision: 
Sec. 208(a). No State or any political subdivision thereof shall 
adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines 
subject to this subchapter. No State shall require certification, in-
spection, or any other approval relating to the control of emissions 
from any new motor vehicle or new motor vehicle engine as condition 
precedent to the initial retail sale, titling (if any), or registration of 
such motor vehicle, motor vehicle engine, or equipment. 
(c) Nothing in this subchapter shall preclude or deny to any State 
or political subdivision thereof, the right otherwise to control, regu-
late, or restrict the use, operation, or movement of registered or 
licensed motor vehicles.32 
As originally introduced, the bill that became the 1967 Act con-
tained no provision for federal pre-emption of state power.33 But 
shortly after the initiation of hearings on the bill before a subcom-
mittee of the Senate Public Works Committee, that subcommittee 
conducted additional hearings on the automotive problem alone; 
and in those hearings the issue of state authority to regulate vehicle 
emissions arose.34 Los Angeles County Supervisor Warren Dorn 
argued that federal law should provide minimum standards and 
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1965). The suggestion was made by Warren Dom, of the Los 
Angeles County Board of Supervisors. 
30. See Hearings on H.R. 463 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 281 (1965). 
31. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
33. See Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 8. 
34. See Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19. 
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allow stricter state rules where conditions require them.85 HEW 
Deputy Undersecretary Dean Coston, however, argued that "utter 
confusion" would result if states were permitted to adopt varying 
standards and that state regulation would be an unnecessary duplica-
tion of federal regulation.36 The automobile industry, through 
Thomas Mann of the AMA, reiterated its concern that "a multi-
plicity of standards could create chaos not only within the industry 
but in the economy and be harmful to the consumer as well."37 
When the bill emerged from the Senate committee, it contained 
the pre-emption language of the present statute, reserving the right 
of the states to regulate vehicle use and allowing California an 
exemption.88 The report explained that this language was a com-
promise between California's interest in setting "more stringent stan-
dards to meet peculiar local conditions" and the auto industry's 
desire for "a single national standard in order to eliminate undue 
economic strain on the industry."39 Only California, the report 
indicated, had demonstrated sufficiently compelling local circum-
stances; if other states were to develop such circumstances in the 
future, Congress should then consider expanding the waiver provi-
sion. According to the report, the compromise was beneficial because 
it would allow California not only to protect its people, but also to 
serve as a testing ground for new regulations, without exposing the 
consumer everywhere to additional costs and without subjecting the 
industry to more than one variation in applicable regulations.40 
The reasons given for the enactment of the pre-emption provi-
sion can be summarized as follows: to protect the manufacturer 
against having to build engines which would comply with a multi-
plicity of standards (Senator Muskie); to protect the vehicle owner 
from having to deal with different standards in each state in which 
he drives (Senator Muskie); to avoid the unnecessary duplication of 
35. Id. at 13-14. 
36. Id. at 107. 
37. Id. at 403. 
!!8. See note 13 supra. 
39. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 81 (1967). 
40. Id. at 33. After the Senate passed the bill, the House Committee altered the 
pre-emption section to permit the Secretary of HEW-rather than the state itself-to 
set special standards for California. That alternation would have reduced the manu-
facturers' difficulty in complying with two sets of rules, since the two sets would not 
be separately administered. See H.R. REP. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22, 69 
(1967). But in the final bill, as enacted by both houses after a conference to work out 
differences between the House and Senate versions, the Senate language was reinstated 
and California was allowed to set her own standards, contingent on the Secretary's 
finding that waiver of pre-emption was proper. See H.R. REP. No. 916, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 18 (1967). 
May 1970] Motor Vehicle Air Pollution 1091 
federal standards (Undersecretary Coston); to avoid "unnecessary 
expense" to the owner (the Senate Public Works Committee); and 
generally to avoid "chaos" and "confusion" (Thomas Mann, Under-
secretary Coston, and the Senate Public Works Committee). Basi-
cally, the reasons are rationalizations for protecting the automobile 
manufacturers from paying the cost of effective pollution control. I 
do not suggest that the cost of reducing pollution should be ignored. 
But it does seem that the states can be trusted to consider whether 
a proposed measure will impose unreasonable burdens on the use of 
automobiles. The image of Congress is not improved by legislation 
designed to protect the manufacturers from the risk that states 
may prize health too highly. Thus, the pre-emption section should be 
promptly and embarrassedly replaced by a provision explicitly recog-
nizing state and local power to enact regulations more stringent 
than the federal standards. 
In the meanwhile there is a good deal that the states can do, since 
fortunately federal pre-emption is not complete. In order to explore 
the limits of permissible state action, it may be helpful to consider 
the validity of a few specific examples of state regulation. 
Ill. VALIDITY OF SPECIFIC TYPES OF STATE REGULATION 
A. Standards Stricter than the Federal 
The federal standard for carbon monoxide emissions from new 
1970 vehicles is twenty-three grams per mile;41 for a state to pre-
scribe a lower standard would be to require "approval relating to 
the control of emissions from any new motor vehicle ... as condi-
tion precedent to the initial retail sale ... "-a requirement which 
is plainly forbidden by section 208 of the Act. Such a require-
ment would compel manufacturers to tailor their products to more 
than one standard, would duplicate a federal standard on the identi-
cal subject, and would impose additional costs on the buyer beyond 
those required for the identical purpose by federal law. This kind of 
regulation is exactly what Congress meant to forbid. 
A literal reading of the statute, however, suggests that once a 
vehicle has been transferred to an ultimate purchaser, there are no 
limits on the state's power to prescribe emission standards as a con-
dition of operation. The pre-emption section speaks only of emis-
sions from "new" vehicles, and "new" vehicles are defined to include 
only those which have "never been transferred to an ultimate pur-
41. 45 C.F.R. § 85.21 (1969). 
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chaser."42 But such a reading would completely subvert the purpose 
of the pre-emption clause, and consequently it seems less than likely 
that the courts would accept it.43 
B. Emission Limits on State-Purchased Vehicles 
If a state establishes emission standards for the automobiles 
which it purchases for state uses, it has technically imposed a standard 
relating to emissions from new motor vehicles, and its regulation 
might therefore seem to be forbidden by the Act's pre-emption sec-
tion. But the state, like any other consumer, presumably is free to 
buy what it chooses. The vice in state regulation, as Congress saw 
it, seems to have been not that a customer might decide that he him-
self preferred low-emission vehicles, but that a state would forbid 
other customers from purchasing vehicles meeting federal standards. 
Any policy consideration favoring pre-emption for the protection of 
the consumer is by definition inapplicable when the state limits only 
its own purchases. 
C. Required Maintenance and Inspection 
The federal statute clearly permits a state to require that vehicles 
equipped with control devices certified under the federal statute be 
maintained in good working order and be inspected annually at the 
owner's expense. In fact, the states not only have the power to require 
maintenance and inspection of federally required devices, but they 
are encouraged and expected to do so. The automobile manufac-
turers were insistent that state inspection was necessary lest "the 
failure of the vehicle owner to maintain the emissions control system 
. . . render the entire program useless and wasteful. "44 Even Mr. 
Coston of HEW, who argued that even California ought to be pre-
empted from imposing additional emission limits on new vehicles, 
expressly favored state maintenance requirements: 
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-7(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
43. See Kennedy&: Weekes, Control of Automobile Emissions-California Experience 
and the Federal Legislation, 33 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 297, 313 (1968). For this reason, 
§ 6-6.2 of the Illinois regulations, which provides generally that diesel engines 
not emit smoke which is equal to or "greater than 30% opacity" was amended before 
adoption to apply only to vehicles manufactured before January I, 1970. ILLINOIS AIR 
POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD RULES &: REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF AIR POL-
LUTION ch. VI, § 6-6.2 (March 25, 1970). The federal standards prescribe 40% and 20% 
capacity for diesel smoke from such vehicles, depending on whether or not the vehicle 
is accelerating. 
44. Hearings on H.R. 463 Before the Subcomm. on Public Health and Welfare of 
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 283 (1965) 
(remarks of Harry F. Barr of GM and AMA). 
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Senator Baker. You don't think the doctrine of Federal preemp-
tion would prevent the State of California or Los Angeles County 
from making additional restrictive regulations on the use or the 
maintenance of automobiles? 
Mr. Coston. No sir; not on the use or maintenance; only-
Senator Baker. But it would prohibit the county of Los Angeles 
on installation of any device as a precondition to the sale of auto-
mobiles? 
Mr. Coston. I think it should .... 45 
An even stronger indication of the legislative intent may be 
found in the 1967 Act itself, for one of the provisions of that Act 
authorized federal grants to state pollution control agencies in order 
to aid in "developing meaningful uniform motor vehicle emission 
device inspection and emission testing programs."46 It is quite 
clear from the Senate report that this provision was designed to leave 
inspection to the states: 
Federal responsibility under this provision would be to insure 
the development of appropriate test procedures and, in general, to 
provide technical assistance. 
State's responsibility would be to assume responsibility for in-
spection of pollution control systems as an integral part of safety 
inspection programs, which some States now have and others are 
developing.47 
An analysis of the policy of the Act also leads to the conclusion 
that state inspection and maintenance requirements are permissible. 
No manufacturer is required to comply with multiple regulations, 
since the states are merely ensuring that the original federal require-
ment is still met; the federal standards are not being duplicated, but 
rather are being enforced by the states. The expense to the owner is 
only that cost which is necessary to maintain the device that was 
initially required by the federal government; so long as the standard 
enforced is the uniform federal one, there are no important multiple 
burdens on O"wners or operators even if the requirement is not 
limited to vehicles licensed in the enacting state. 
D. Requiring Compliance with the Federal Standard 
If a state is to require maintenance and inspection,48 it must have 
some standard against which each vehicle can be tested; and it 
45. Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 115. 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6b (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
47. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967). 
48. See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra. 
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appears at first glance that to require adherence to the original 
federal standard of twenty-three grams of carbon monoxide per mile 
would be exactly in accord with federal policy. 
The federal standard, however, as was frequently pointed out 
during the hearings, does not require that each vehicle comply. The 
manufacturer satisfies the requirement if representative samples of 
each model obtain federal approval, even though individual vehicles 
of the same type may be either above or below the standard. Conse-
quently, for the states to hold each automobile to the federal stan-
dard would be to impose an additional requirement beyond that of 
federal law and would arguably be illegal. The following colloquy is 
illustrative: 
Senator Muskie. Now if the inspection system is going to be in-
stalled it would be applied motorist by motorist. Let us say a 
motorist bought an old car and was told it had exhaustive device 
controls on it and he goes in for his annual inspection, if that is 
what it is, and he is told his car does not meet the standard, that it 
is 300. Now what should happen to him at that point? .. . 
Mr. Misch (of Ford). . .. Let me get into the record ... typical 
items that are being considered as part of that maintenance or in-
spection. 
For one thing, on the air injection systems, the inspection should 
be made of the positive crankcase ventilation system to determine if 
it is operational .... On the air injection system we suggest that 
plumbing connections be checked for tightness at appropriate routing 
and that plumbing is properly in place. The air pump drive belt 
should be properly tensioned; idle speeds should be adjusted within 
proper limits, and ignition timing should be adjusted or checked for 
proper limits. 
Senator Muskie. So to clarify the apparent dilemma of the 
motorist whose situation I hypothecated a few moments ago, he is 
not going to be penalized because his car does not have the inherent 
capacity to meet the California or national standards; all he is re-
quired to do or all he would be required to do under the inspection 
system which you contemplate is a mechanical inspection of his 
vehicle to insure that it is operating at or near its maximum.49 
The reason for testing a small sample is not a desire to impose a lax 
standard; rather, it is the desire to avoid the expense and difficulties 
that would be involved in testing each vehicle. Thus, if a state 
should devise a simple means of testing emissions, then requiring 
each car to meet the federal standard would further, rather than 
hinder, federal policy. Therefore, the express statutory recognition 
49. Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 477-79. 
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of state inspection systems should be held to permit states to require 
each vehicle covered by federal standards to meet those standards at 
any time after initial sale and registration. 
E. Provisions Applicable to Pre-1968 Vehicles 
Quite clearly a state may require that 1967 and earlier models be 
equipped with pollution control equipment. The federal standards 
themselves apply only to 1968 and later models, and the statute pro-
vides for federal standards only for new vehicles, which are defined 
as vehicles which have "never been transferred to an ultimate pur-
chaser.''50 It is of course conceivable that Congress meant to preclude 
state regulation even of vehicles exempt from the federal law, but 
the existence of such a regulatory vacuum is not to be lightly in-
ferred. Moreover, HEW's Dean Coston, who gave the principal testi-
mony in favor of pre-emption, made it clear that he had no intention 
of forbidding the states to deal with emissions from older cars: 
Mr. Coston. . . . The Federal law, however, is totally silent on 
the question of used cars. So here I think that, even if you apply a 
full preemption doctrine to the Clean Air Act, the State of Cali-
fornia would be free to deal with used cars in different terms. 
Senator Muskie. But only because the Federal law does not apply. 
Mr. Coston. That is correct.51 
The same point is also clearly made in the Senate report: 
While there has been a great deal of concern expressed regard-
ing control of new vehicles little attention has been paid to control 
of used vehicles, either their emissions or their use .... Any signifi-
cant advance in control of used vehicles would result in a correspond-
ing reduction in air pollution. These are areas in which the States 
and local government can be most effective.52 
Thus, the legislative intention is plain with respect to pre-1968 
vehicles. Furthermore, state and local controls on the emissions of 
such vehicles would not violate any of the policies behind the pre-
emption provision. Such regulations would not subject manufac-
turers to multiple requirements, since these vehicles have long since 
left the manufacturers' hands; it would not duplicate federal stan-
dards, for there are no federal standards for such cars; and it would 
not result in the unnecessary expense with which the legislators 
were concerned, because it can hardly be unnecessary to insist 
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1857£-7(3) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
51. Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 108-09. 
52. S, REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967). 
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that all cars be equipped with one control device. Depending on the 
form of the state regulation, it might or might not impose special 
burdens on out-of-state drivers. If the state required the attachment 
of control devices upon the transfer of an older vehicle to a resident 
of the state, or if it required such attachment when the owner moved 
to the state, as California does, 53 or if it required the attachment of 
an emission control device as a prerequisite to automobile registra-
tion in the state, then no driver would be subjected to multiple stan-
dards and no out-of-state driver would be inconvenienced. Although 
a broader regulation forbidding the operation of any pre-1968 
vehicle without controls would impose a significant burden on 
operators from other states, the authority of the Supreme Court deci-
sion concerning smoke controls on interstate vessels,54 along with 
the complete absence of federal regulatory authority over pre-1968 
vehicles, and along with the explicit statements in the legislative 
history indicating that states are free to regulate used vehicles, sug-
gest that the states have this broader power as well.65 
F. Regulation of Types of Emissions Not Referred to in the 
Federal Act 
It is difficult to determine whether a state may regulate the emis-
sion of nitrogen oxide or visible smoke from new gasoline-powered 
vehicles. On the one hand, the federal statute expressly forbids any 
state control over emissions from new vehicles;56 on the other hand, 
the philosophy underlying pre-emption seems to be that a manufac-
turer subjected to federal regulation should not also be subjected to 
regulation by the states. Since there are not yet any federal standards 
applicable to the emission of either smoke or nitrogen oxides from 
new gasoline-powered vehicles, the argument for freedom from state 
standards is weakened. It seems clear that neither Congress nor the 
HEW Secretary desired a total absence of standards governing these 
pollutants; they desired merely to prevent the duplication of federal 
standards by state standards. Moreover, there is some support in the 
legislative history for the view that states may regulate emissions 
which are not referred to in the federal regulations. Thomas Mann 
of the AMA, in arguing for pre-emption, was asked whether he 
would like California and other states to be forbidden to regulate 
53. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY ConE, § 39129 (West Supp. 1970). 
54. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. 
55. See Kennedy & Weekes, supra note 43, at 313-14. 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6a (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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nitrogen oxides as well as hydrocarbon and carbon monoxide emis-
sions: 
Senator Muskie. [I]f California feels that the oxides of nitrogen 
problem is so critical in Los Angeles County, that it ought to add 
this additional control should we preclude California from doing so? 
Mr. Mann. Senator, my understanding is that the problem of 
preemption only arises where the Federal Government, the National 
Government, has established a standard, has occupied the area .... 57 
It therefore appears that states may regulate smoke emissions 
from new gasoline-powered vehicles,58 and that they may regulate 
other emissions, such as nitrogen oxides or lead, which are not now 
touched by federal standards. 
G. Installation of Additional Devices upon Transfer by the 
Original Purchaser 
A state requirement that additional devices be placed on a vehicle 
when it is sold by the original ultimate purchaser probably passes 
muster. The hearings are replete with references to the states' con-
tinued power over "used" vehicles;59 and although "used" may have 
been intended by Congress to be a euphemism for "pre-1968," it is 
difficult to stretch the statutory pre-emption regarding "new" ve-
hicles to include 1968 automobiles resold in 1970. The pre-emption 
may extend slightly beyond the precise statutory definition of "new" 
vehicles, in order to avoid an obvious circumvention of the statute 
by a state's regulation of the use of automobiles that are new in 
every sense except that they have been bought from the dealer.60 
In light of the purpose of pre-emption and the language of the 
statute, it seems most appropriate to hold that a car is "new" only 
until it is transferred by the initial ultimate purchaser. It is true that 
initial sales may be slightly impeded by the possibility that the 
original owner may have to upgrade his pollution controls before 
reselling his car, but the impact that such a remote regulation would 
have upon the manufacturer is certainly not the problem that led 
Congress to enact the pre-emption provision. 
H. Limitations on Driving in Certain Areas 
It is clear that the federal law allows a state to provide that no 
private automobiles may be driven in certain areas. Such a state law 
57. Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 1781. 
58. Such a regulation is found in !LL1No1s AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD, Ruu.s &: 
REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE CONTROL OF Am POLLUTION ch. VI, § 6-5.1 (March 25, 1970). 
59. See text accompanying notes 50-55 supra. 
60. See text accompanying notes 42-43 supra. 
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might apply at all times or only during times of high carbon monox-
ide concentration. Even though this regulation would apply to ve-
hicles with devices approved under federal law, it is exactly the type 
of provision for which the clause permitting state regulation was de-
signed. Not only does such a regulation expressly deal with vehicle 
use rather than with emissions, but it does no violence to the spirit of 
the pre-emption section. Mr. Coston of HEW, who argued in favor 
of pre-emption, 61 spoke about this specific situation: 
I think it is perfectly appropriate for the local jurisdiction to take 
measures with respect to the use of automobiles which it might find 
necessary in order to protect the public health. If the problem is 
serious enough, for example, to restrict the use of the automobile 
within the area, I think the local community ought to do that.62 
Moreover, the Senate report described the states' power over vehicle 
use as being "of particular importance .... It may be that, in some 
areas, certain conditions at certain times will require control of 
movement of vehicles . . . . These are areas in which the States and 
local government can be most effective."63 
The same result follows whether the limitation on use takes 
the form of prohibition or of tolls or other charges. In either 
case state or local action would not offend any federal policy: No 
manufacturer would be required to build engines meeting vary-
ing standards; federal standards would not be duplicated; and the 
out-of-state driver would have no more difficulty in complying than 
would the local driver. That such a restriction might add to the cost 
of transportation cannot be decisive; virtually any state action against 
automotive pollution would have this effect, and yet not all state 
action is forbidden. 
I. Emission Limitations in Certain Areas 
Although a state may exclude all vehicles from designated areas,6~ 
it is doubtful that it may exclude from such areas only those 
vehicles which emit more than a specified amount of carbon monox-
ide. Such a regulation is distinguishable from the regulation analyzed 
above because it differentiates among vehicles according to whether 
or not they comply with a standard more strict than the federal 
standard. With respect to pre-1968 vehicles, of course, such a dis-
tinction is perfectly acceptable since emissions from such vehicles 
61. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
62. Senate Automotive Hearings, supra note 19, at 115. 
63. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1967). 
64. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra. 
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can be directly regulated. But with respect to new vehicles, such a 
regulation may be impermissible, because it has a very strong ten-
dency to regulate emission controls even though it ostensibly regu-
lates only vehicle use. The language of the federal prohibition-that 
"[n]o state ... shall ... attempt to enforce any standard relating to 
emissions"65-means that adverse consequences may not be attached 
to selling or operating noncomplying vehicles; and that result is 
precisely what the regulation considered here would accomplish. 
The adverse consequence in this instance is exclusion from areas 
where other vehicles are permitted to go. This case differs only in 
degree from a total ban on the use of noncomplying vehicles. 
J. The Prohibiting or Taxing of the Sale of 
Leaded Fuels 
Strictly speaking, limits on what goes into an engine are not 
limits on what comes out; and. the legislative history with respect to 
older vehicles and use regulations recognized the principle that state 
action is usually not pre-empted on matters outside the scope of 
federal regulation. 66 
However, the 1967 Act did not ignore.the subject of fuels; the Act 
contained a provision which requires the registration of fuel addi-
tives with the Secretary of HEW.67 That section says nothing about 
regulation of additives; and the purpose of the provision is only "to 
insure full access to the technical information needed to evaluate 
the possible health hazards of such materials .... "68 Nonetheless, the 
Senate committee also contemplated that the Secretary might, pur-
suant to his authority to set standards for emissions from new vehi-
cles, take action against any additives found by him to be dangerous.69 
Thus, it can be argued that because the Secretary of HEW can 
deal indirectly with lead additives by regulating lead emissions from 
new vehicles, the states are forbidden to regulate lead additives di-
rectly. Such an interpretation, however, would be an undue expan-
sion of the pre-emptive language of the statute, since the states are 
forbidden only to regulate emissions. Moreover, the policies under-
lying federal pre-emption are inapplicable to fuel regulations. So long 
as leadless fuels can be satisfactorily consumed in ordinary vehicle 
65. See text accompanying note 32 supra. 
66, See text accompanying notes 50-55, 61-63 supra. 
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-6b (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
68. S. REP. No. 403, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1967). 
69. Id. 
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engines,70 a fuel regulation imposes no burden on the automotive 
manufacturer, creates no duplication of present federal standards, 
and places no special burdens on out-of-state drivers. It may add to 
the expense of operating vehicles, but uniformity and freedom from 
multiple burdens appear to be the principal reasons for the pre-
emption section, and the added expense seems minor in comparison 
with the states' obvious interest in regulating fuel content.71 
K. Prohibiting the Sale of Internal-Combustion Engines 
Prohibiting the sale of internal-combustion engines is not, strictly 
speaking, an emission regulation, since it neither restricts emissions 
nor conditions sale upon the attachment of emission control devices. 
Nonetheless, such a prohibition may have the same effect as prohibit-
ing the sale of vehicles that do not meet a state emission standard. 
A similar case would arise if the state were to forbid the sale of gaso-
line, for again emissions that are permissible under federal stan-
dards would be affected by indirect regulation. Arguably both of 
these regulations are forbidden; a state prohibition on the sale of 
leaded gasoline-a permissible regulation-is distinguished only be-
cause lead emissions are not covered by current federal standards.72 
Yet the impact of a total ban on the sale of internal-combustion 
engines is not precisely the same as the impact of an emission regula-
tion. No manufacturer is required to meet multiple standards, because 
the product is excluded from the enacting state altogether. Moreover, 
internal-combustion engines are not made more expensive; they are 
taken off the market. Finally, there is no burden on out-of-state 
drivers since only sales are affected. 
It is doubtful that just because mere regulation is forbidden, the 
more drastic tool of total exclusion is forbidden as well. In the case 
of highway billboards, for example, the federal government might 
well wish to ensure production efficiency by prescribing that all bill-
boards in the nation be of standard sizes, colors, and types and that 
the states may not alter those standards. In such a situation, the 
policy of production efficiency would not be affected by a state's 
decision to ban billboards entirely, even though the state acts for 
the same reasons of aesthetics that led to the initial federal standards. 
70. The leadless premium fuel now marketed on the East Coast can be used in 
most engines. See text accompanying note 14 supra. Merely leaving the lead out of 
present leaded fuels, however, might require engine modifications and thus complicate 
the legal question. See AIR & WATER NEWS, Feb. 16, 1970, at 2. 
71. See text accompanying note 15 supra. 
72. See text accompanying notes 66-70 supra. 
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Prohibition of the sale of internal-combustion engines seems to fall 
within the same category. 
L. Prohibiting the Sale of Vehicles with Excessive Horsepower 
As in the case of a ban on internal-combustion engines, the pur-
pose and effect of placing a maximum horsepower limit on automo-
biles may be to reduce emissions from new vehicles by limiting the 
amount of fuel consumed. Unlike the total ban, however, a horse-
power limitation could conceivably be responsive to policies other 
than air pollution control. Larger vehicles place more of a burden 
on highway surfaces and take up more space in parking and in traf-
fic. Furthermore, it can be argued that fuel savings are necessary for 
energy conservation. Thus, it is not necessarily clear from the regula-
tion itself that its purpose is to regulate emissions, and the courts 
would probably refuse to investigate the motives of the legislature or 
agency that adopted the rule. One way to test the proposition is to ask 
whether existing license taxes which vary with horsepower are now 
unlawful merely because the higher tax has a slightly inhibitive 
effect upon the purchase of vehicles with high horsepower and thus 
with a high emission level.73 The answer is surely no, but not simply 
because the measure is a tax rather than a regulation; a differential 
tax based explicitly on emissions would clearly be pre-empted. There-
fore, the remote impact of a horsepower distinction upon emissions 
and the existence of justifications for that distinction other than air 
pollution control would allow the horsepower provision to be upheld 
in either case. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The conclusions suggested in this Article are tentative; so far as 
I know, no court has yet decided any of the hypothetical cases dis-
cussed. A recent decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit, however, has given encouragement to a narrow 
reading of the pre-emption provision.74 That case involved the Na-
tional Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, which contains a provi-
sion forbidding state regulation of an item that is covered, with 
respect to the "same aspect of performance," by federal safety stan-
dards.75 A federal standard permitting optional headlights that do 
not impair "the effectiveness of the required equipment" was con-
7!!. Such provisions are fairly common. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 1/2, § !l-806 
(Smith-Hurd 1970). 
74. Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969). 
75. 15 U.S.C. § l!l92(d) (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
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strued to refer only to the effect of such headlights on the vision of 
the driver whose car is equipped with the optional lights, and not to 
their effect on drivers of other vehicles: "If traffic safety is furthered 
by a traditional type of state regulation ... , a narrow construction 
of the pre-emptive effect of the federal Act and standard ... is re-
quired."76 
What the states ought to do about automobile pollution is a 
difficult question. The essential point of this Article is simply that 
the states should be given a fair chance to deal with the problem. 
Pre-emption is a disgrace. 
Yet there is much the states can presently do, and consequently 
pre-emption is not an excuse for total inaction. Among the more 
promising avenues open now are restrictions on use, taxes on the 
sale of leaded fuels, and the establishment of rapid transit. Addi-
tional legislation will probably be necessary if these avenues are to 
be pursued; the time to seek it is now. 
76. 419 F.2d at 511. 
